
# Sinking of the Deepwater Horizon

11 perish and 115 survive

#### The Rig

- Rig cost about \$500,000 per day to contract
- With all the drilling spread, helicopters, support vessels, other services cost about \$1,000,000 per day
- 2001 the rig cost about \$350,000,000 to build
- It is a semi-submersible rig capable of working in 10,000 feet of water
- To keep it on location Dynamic Positioning is used
- 2009 DWH drilled the deepest oil & gas well in the world 35,050 feet (6 miles +)





Nautilus, being transported on a Heavy-Lift vessel





L and R, the Deepwater Horizon on location in better days


















Early morning Day 2 – Note the hole burned through the aluminum helideck




Day 2, morning – settling quite low in the water now – fuel and oil slick forming



Support vessels using their fire fighting gear to cool the rig – note the list developing











#### Investigation Team Mandate

- To gather, review, and analyze the facts and information surrounding the incident to determine causes
- Team was not to speculate in the absence of evidence
- Team was to report on validated factual evidence available

#### The Team

- Internal to Transocean
- Experts from relevant technical fields
- Specialists in Incident prevention
- Specialists in Incident Investigation
- Legal advisors
- Administration

#### Team Roles

- Technical experts in drilling, mechanical, BOP functioning, Petroleum engineering
- Accident Prevention Specialists for fire, explosion, emergency response, evacuation
- Accident Investigation Specialists to facilitate the investigation process and methodology, maintain accurate time line of events, validate event documentation, establish the root causes

#### Team Roles (cont'd)

- Legal advisors to provide the team with legal privileges afforded client lawyer relationship and to provide legal aid assistance for research etc.
- Administration to provide vast array of administration services such as travel, support, documentation control, research documentation for specific points, member living accommodations, etc.

### Establishing the Team

Identifying and bringing members together

 Identifying a location that would accommodate long term occupancy that allowed flexibility

Due to nature of incident effective security was necessary

#### Initial Challenges

- Investigation Strategy
  - Transocean utilized the Kelvin TOPSET Process
  - Identify the the scope of the investigation
  - Ensure investigation documentation matched Company
  - Develop electronic system to capture event and timeline
  - Develop a system to record events & timelines to match
  - Maintain document control and data input
  - Ensuring all used the same investigative process and methodology

### Initial Challenges

Document Control (thousands of documents)

 Ensure all events were identified as events and not factual statements

Legal Hurdles

### Initial Challenges (cont'd)

- Volume of interviews to conduct
- Setting up IT equipment for team and investigative process
- Organizing the investigation into specialized teams
  - Well Control
  - Mechanical
  - Fire and Explosion
- Establishing an effective reportable root cause analysis system
- Producing the report

# Companies Involved in Drilling the Well

- BP
  - Managed the development and operation
  - Provided direction and support to onboard personnel
  - On shore personnel consisted of 4 people
  - Off shore personnel consisted of 6 people
  - Well site leaders on the rig directed ops, coordinated contractors, reported to BP onshore team

- Transocean
  - Provided the rig and people to operate it
    - Drill crews
    - Marine crews
    - Maintenance crews

Halliburton

- Provide specialist cementing services
- 2 specialists on board DWH

- Sperry Sun
  - Sophisticated well monitoring system
    - Monitor
    - Interpret data
    - Detect kicks
    - 2 people on board

- M-I Swaco
  - Provided drilling mud, equipment, personnel
  - 4 on board

Schlumberger

Provided equipment & personnel for well and cement logging

Weatherford

- Provided casing accessories
- 2 people on board

Tidewater Marine

- Provided offshore supply vessel which carried
  - Drilling equipment
  - Drilling chemicals
  - Food
  - Fuel oil
  - Fresh water

### Key Findings

- BP decisions set the stage for loss of well control
  - Reducing the target depth of the well
  - Considering changes to the well casing
  - Using a lower circulating rate than the parameters specified to convert the float collar
  - Reducing cement density with nitrogen foam
  - Using a lesser quantity of cement than that specified in BP procedures
  - Deciding not to perform a complete bottoms-up circulation before cementing

- Running Production Casing
  - The casing design selected required the development of a minimal and technically complex cement program to avoid damaging the formation during cementing, leaving little margin for error. The risk was increased by failing to adequately test the cement program.

- Converting the float collar
  - The plan was deviated from the original plan to convert the float collar and proceeded despite observations of anomalies.
  - The team determined that it was possible that the float collar did not convert and left a clear path for the flow of hydrocarbons from the formation

Cementing

- Cement failed in the shoe track and across the producing formations. This failure allowed hydrocarbons to flow into the well
- Failed factors include;
  - Complexity of cement program
  - Inadequate cement testing
  - Cement contamination during operation
  - Inadequate cement testing after pumping

Temporary Abandonment Procedure

Final temporary plan contained unnecessary risks that

were not subjected to formal risk analysis

- Displacement
  - Initial displacement was planned incorrectly, and the execution did not meet the objective of allowing for a valid negative pressure test
  - Displaced with seawater which analysis determined objective was not achieved:
    - Calculations errors
    - Low pump efficiencies because of spacer materials
    - Down hole losses
    - Spacer moved below closed annular

Negative Pressure Test

- Results of the test were misinterpreted/failed. Decision was made to proceed with final displacement.
  - This test is necessary to confirm that the cement will block flow from the reservoir into the well after mud is replaced with seawater

- Sheen Test and Final Displacement
  - Incident analysis indicated that a change in flow path from the well during the final displacement masked the influxes into the wellbore

Activation of the BOP

- The BOP functioned and closed but was overcome by well conditions
  - High flow from the well prevented the annular BOP element from sealing
  - The concentrated flow eroded the drill pipe above annular
  - VBRs isolated the annular space temporarily until pressure increased in the drill pipe and ruptured it allowing hydrocarbons to flow to the riser
  - When the DWH drifted off location the drill pipe parted



Muster and Evacuation

- All evacuated personnel were successfully evacuated from the forward lifeboat muster station
  - 100 evacuated in lifeboats
  - 7 evacuated in life raft
  - 8 jumped and were rescued from the sea

All evacuees were taken to the supply vessel nearby and then taken to land

### QUESTIONS?